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China’s 40-year Road to Innovation
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of policies and practice of innovation in 
China for the past 40 years. 
Design/methodology/approach
This is a review paper. It adopts a different multi-dimensional, qualitative methodology to 
examine China’s trajectory of innovation from the economic reform since 1978, highlighting 
‘China’ experiences in the developing innovation-driven economy, also pointing the challenges 
that China faces in this transition process and future prospects. The analysis of China’s 
innovation performance was based mostly on secondary data from sources and institutions that 
use statistical data to build country rankings, such as Global Innovation Index (GII) and Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). 
Findings 
It is found that the institutional foundations of national innovation system in China are already 
being laid, and so far, China has made extraordinary progress regarding innovation performance 
from country to region and from business to individual. However, some critical challenges in 
its innovation-driven development still need urgent attention and effective efforts to reinforce 
them.
Originality/value
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by providing an overview of the evolution of the 
policies and practices of innovation development in China since the 1978 economic reforms, 
and explores the Chinese experiences in transforming into an innovation-driven economy. 
Keywords China, Innovation, Chinese experiences, The innovation-driven development
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
The past 40 years have witnessed fascinating socioeconomic change and extraordinary 
economic growth of China, transforming from an impoverished agrarian economy into an 
industrial juggernaut, and from a small exporter of resources and unskilled-labour-intensive 
products to a significant player of world-manufactured exports. By the end of 2017, the 
National Bureau of Statistics indicated that China's GDP was 87.7122 trillion yuan (US$12.25 
trillion), up from 306 billion US dollars in 1980. From 1978 until 2017, China's average annual 
GDP growth was 9.56%. The total industrial value-added increased from US$91 billion in 1980 
to US$ 4.951 trillion in 2017, and the share of industrial products in total exports increased 
from 50% in 1980 to more than 95% in 2017 (NBS, 2017). 
Indeed, China's unprecedented economic success under an authoritarian political system over 
the past 40 years has raised many questions: What factor led to China's rapid economic growth? 
Given that China's success in the last couple of decades toppled the notion about the realities 
of government's role in economies, is there a 'China model' that will replace the Western model 
of modernisation? The primary mechanism driving this growth is simple: a constant flow of 
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new workers into the labour force and massive investment in housing, infrastructure, and 
industrial capacity. Additionally, low wages for workers leads to low production cost; low 
prices in niche markets lead to higher volumes; small companies turn into large companies, 
which, in turn, have a greater competitive advantage in global markets (Mckinsey Global 
Institute, 2015). Parallel to this self-cost reduction mechanism, these companies have built up 
knowledge and experience in the emerging markets, gradually evolving from imitators to 
imaginative and effective innovators (Gassmann et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Zhu (2012) 
provided a different picture of China's growth by examining the contributions of sector-level 
productivity growth and resource relocation across sectors and companies within a sector to 
aggregate productivity growth. Given this context, Zhu argued that China's rapid growth is 
driven by productivity growth rather than massive investment, high saving rates and 
accumulation of labour. Despite the rapid 40-year economic growth after 1978, China’s 
productivity level is still much lower than that of the U.S., meaning China still has large space 
for productivity growth though future economic reforms (Liu, 2016). Although capital and 
labour input has played an important role in the early stage of China’s economic development, 
given China's transformation into an innovation-driven economy, the new source of growth 
must become productivity as measured by total-factor productivity (TFP). To this end, 
innovation and entrepreneurship are the most important means of increasing TFP (Song et al., 
2016). Considering China now faces crucial challenges in sustainable development and 
structural change, it is pertinent to review China’s road to innovation.
In recent years, China's rising profile in innovation has challenged the future of U.S. 
technological leadership. In 2017, China's national research and development (R&D) spending 
reached RMB 1.76 trillion (roughly $279 billion), poised to overtake that of the United States 
within the next decade.1 According to Global Innovation Index 2018, a ranking produced by 
INSEAD, China is now 17th among the most innovative countries in the world, up five positions 
from 2017, marking the first time that the Asian country finished in the GII's top 20 (INSEAD, 
2018). China also made headlines with remarkable accomplishments in high-tech 
manufacturing industries, including aerospace, computer and communications equipment, 
semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and scientific instruments. The global output from high-tech 
manufacturing totalled $1.6 trillion in 2016, with the U.S. (31%) and China (24%) as the largest 
providers of the global share. China’s output has risen sharply over time and now exceeds that 
of the EU.2 Moreover, China recently surpassed Japan as the number two patent cooperation 
treaty (PCT) filer, just behind the United States, according to the World IP Organization 
(WIPO). 
Undoubtedly, China is dramatically catching up and is on the verge of becoming a world-
leading technological innovator. An increasing number of Chinese firms with global ambitions, 
such as Huawei and Tencent, have stood at the centre of the world stage. The prospect of China's 
achievements in innovation has attracted both worldwide attention and discussion. Typical 
questions include what are China’s aspiration for innovation? How has China performed its 
overall innovation development in recent years and what are the characters of China’s 
1 'China spends $279 bln on R&D in 2017: Science minister', Reuters, 27 February 2018. 
2 'The rise of China in science and engineering', National Science Foundation, 2018. 
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innovation process? What are Chinese experiences in developing an innovation-driven 
economy? This paper seeks to answer these questions by exploring China's ongoing experiment 
in innovation-oriented transformation through its 40 years of socioeconomic development. 
The paper is organised as follows. After a description of research methodology and data, 
Section 3 discusses China's aspiration for innovation. Section 4 investigates the performance 
of China's innovation-driven development. Section 5 summarises the Chinese experiences in 
developing an innovation-driven economy, Section 6 discusses trends and challenges of 
innovation in China. Section 7 provides a conclusion. 
2. Research Methods and Data
This paper adopts a different multi-dimensional, qualitative methodology to examine China’s 
trajectory of innovation since its economic reform of 1978. Specifically, this paper integrates 
historical archives and a case study approach, covering policies and practices at both the macro- 
and micro-levels. 
Although many academic researchers, practitioners, and policy makers have tried to find 
different ways to measure innovation performance to create a better understanding of the 
innovation system, innovation is a qualitative and complex phenomenon that is greatly 
influenced by a given context and geographical background; therefore, a holistic and 
multipronged view of innovation is needed (Smith, 2005). Some indices and innovation 
rankings try to evaluate innovation performance and rank the performance of different countries 
against each other by some strict metrics. These usually measure innovation performance on 
the basis of innovation input/output, thus highlighting strengths and weaknesses according to 
their respective methods (ibid.). Although these studies collect rich data from the public domain, 
it is difficult to compare their innovation rankings because of their differences in data-gathering 
methods and geographical locations. In general, global innovation indices and rankings 
produced by reputable international organisations are given credit for their advanced methods 
for measurement, primary data collection, and comprehensiveness in international coverage. 
Therefore, the global innovation rankings generated by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and 
INSEAD with other supplementary measurements are a valuable means to evaluate updated 
innovation performance in China.
3. China’s Aspiration for Innovation
Thousands of years ago, when ancient China was one of the most sophisticated civilisations of 
its time, the spate of inventions that flourished in ancient China constituted one of the earliest 
potential revolutions in industry. Among the many Chinse technological contributions, one can 
list Chinese invented paper (200 C.E.), bone china (300 C.E.), the magnetic compass (300 C.E.), 
the letter press (750 C.E.) and, of course, gunpowder (1000 C.E.). For some reason, China's 
innovative ability languished after the 14th century. This rich history suggests that China seeks 
to re-establish its identity as a leader in technological innovation (Yip and Mckern, 2016).
During the period of Chinese contemporary history, it is necessary to highlight three 
watershed years that provide a more explicit picture of China's economic development. The 
first is 1978, when China began to implement a series of economic reforms. From 1978 to 1982, 
the central government mainly focused on rural liberalisation. The ‘Personal Responsibility 
System' was implemented to allow farm households to lease land from the local government 
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and sell the output on a double-track price system: a fixed quota at a state-controlled price and 
the rest at freely determined prices in agriculture markets. Township and village governments 
were encouraged to establish township and village enterprises (TVEs) for the production and 
sale of industrial goods outside the central plan. After 1980, China's economy gradually opened 
to international trade and capital with the devaluation of the highly overvalued exchange rate 
and the establishment of a retention system for foreign exchange for exporting firms. This trade 
liberalisation went far and deep throughout the 1980s. Some of the remarkable implementations, 
such as an increasing amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), setting up special economic 
zones in the coastal regions, and establishing a rudimentary foreign exchange market, were 
carried out from the top-down. 
The second landmark is 1992, with Deng Xiaoping's famous tour of southern China. This 
called for an all-out effort to speed up the reform, re-igniting the reform momentum. There was 
also a formal endorsement of the ‘socialist market economy' as the objective of China's 
economic reform at the party congress in 1992 (Sachs et al., 1994). 
The third turning point is 2006, when China officially released the Medium and Long-Term 
National Plan for Science and Technology Development (MLNP) (2006-2020), a milestone in 
China's economic transformation. The goal of this strategy is to make China a world-leading 
innovation country by developing its innovation economy. In particular, the heart of this 
strategy is to foster indigenous innovation paradigms that include three aspects: introducing 
technology through digestion and absorption, integrating innovation, and encouraging original 
innovation (Chen et al., 2018). The implementation of the MLNP seeks to ensure that China 
will not fall into the so-called ‘middle income trap' and that China's future prosperity is shared 
among the whole population with inclusive development (Liu et al., 2017). 
In retrospect, China's achievements over the past 40 years have been phenomenal. Its rapid 
economic growth has driven its per capita income from one of the poorest in the world to the 
level of an upper-income country, and from an economy with basic agriculture and technology 
to a global manufacturing centre-hub, transitioning now into an innovation-driven economy. 
To avoid stagnation in its economic growth, China is urgently moving up the industrial value 
chain, which is not an easy achievement as the previous experiences of Southern Asian 
countries have demonstrated. De Meyer and Grag (2005) noted that the firms in these countries 
have failed to climb the global industrial value chain in the late twentieth century is the limited 
knowledge transfer from foreign multinational companies to the local firms despite the inflow 
of heavy FDI. It seems that China’s previous growth model faces similar challenges. Since the 
1978 reforms, China has experienced a substantial transformation in the area of innovation. At 
the beginning of the reform, many Chinese companies benefitted from various policies, thereby 
heavily relied on foreign technology transfer through imports and FDI for technology upgrading. 
This was conducive to imitation-type diffusional innovation (Fu and Gong, 2011). The fastest 
growth of FDI inflows started from Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992: as China moved 
towards a nationwide implementation of open policies for FDI, inflows of FDI reached a peak 
level in the later 1990s. Although China’s innovation capabilities have been improved greatly 
owing to FDI, which served as a major platform to provide technological and managerial 
knowledge as well as financial capital in the transfer of advanced foreign technology to 
developing countries (ibid.), there resulted a lack of creativity and indigenous capabilities in 
core technologies given heavy dependence on foreign technology transfer and imitation. FDI is 
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employed as major vehicle for foreign technology transfer. In the late 1990s, the focus of 
China’s technology development was transitioning from technology transfer to indigenous 
innovation. The promotion of indigenous innovation was formally announced as a priority in 
2006, whereupon the total R&D expenditure grew from RMB 7.4 billion in 1987 to RMB 35 
billion in 1995 and to RMB 300.3 billion in 2016, showing an average annual growth rate of 
21% (MOST, 2010a). While China has experienced rapid economic growth and a fascinating 
transformation of it economy and industry, with the disappearance of the demographic dividend 
and high social and environmental cost, sustainable growth is becoming less and less promising. 
Therefore, it is urgent for China to transition into a more skill-intensive and technology-
intensive growth path. In addition, the pursuit of an innovation-driven goal of economic 
transformation should foster indigenous innovation with due consideration of the Chinese 
context. As Fu (2015) stated, the long-term core strategy for the Chinese government is to 
encourage indigenous innovation and build an innovation-oriented economy.  
4. The Performance of China’s Innovation-driven Development
4.1 the overall performance of the innovation-driven development
As shown in the previous section, China has a long history as an innovative culture. After years 
of wars, the road to China's revival is full of twists and turns. It began from the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Culture 
Revolution' from 1966 to 1976. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the government began 
to pursue a new economic development strategy and open-door policy with the purpose of 
rebuilding the economy and society devastated by the Culture Revolution. Again, in 2006, the 
release of the MLNP manifested China's determination to turn the country into an innovative 
economy by 2020. 
Innovation has been placed in the heart of China's future national development strategy. After 
more than 10 years of accumulating experiences and reallocating resources, along with re-
establishing a national system of incentives for science, technology, and innovation (STI), 
China is on its way to becoming an innovation powerhouse by continuously increasing STI 
investment, reinforcing the country's scientific and technological strength, and improving its 
competitive ability all around. Gradually, there has been more empirical evidence from the 
literature regarding China's innovation system, with improved availability of STI data. 
However, research on a comprehensive and systematic review of China's innovation system 
and the evolution of innovation strategies and instruction infrastructure, as well as their impact 
on China's innovation performance and technological upgrading, has yet to be done (Ding and 
Li, 2015). In this section, we will try to deliver a full picture of the performance of China’s 
innovation-driven development by using various data from resources such as the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, the World Economic Forum, and China’s official government 
website. 
The MLNP explicitly stated the goal of transforming China into ‘an innovative society' by 
2020: building globally competitive high-tech products, brands and standards, while reducing 
its dependence on imported technologies (Xu, 2017). Hence, a series of specific targets for 2020 
have been set up:
To increase domestic investment in R&D to at least 2.5 percent of GDP; increase the 
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contribution of technology innovation to the economy to 60 percent; reduce China’s reliance 
on imported technology to no more than 30 percent; increase patent application to the level of 
the world’s top five countries; and join the world’s top five countries in citation of international 
science and technology publications. (State Council, 2006)
In 2015, China spent RMB1416.9 billion on R&D, equivalent to 2.07% of GDP, in 
comparison with R&D spending as a percentage of GDP of 0.56% in 1996. Internationally, as 
shown in Figure 1, China's investment in R&D, as a share of GDP, was ahead of some 
developed economies, such as the UK, Spain, Portugal, Norway and the Netherlands. Also, 
China was also leading other emerging economies, such as Russia, Mexico, Greece and India. 
The most updated R&D spending is RMB 1.76 trillion in 2017, equivalent to 2.12% of GDP. 
However, compared with advanced innovative economies, such as South Korea, Israel, etc., 
China's R&D investment still needs to be improved by some means. Concerning a long-
standing outlook of China's key metric of innovation, Figure 2 shows a clear linear upward 
trend for this metric by implementing a simple time-series of data from 1996 to 2015. 
Noticeably, R&D spending as a percentage of GDP continuously increases over the years with 
an expected a long-term trend that will reach 2.525% by 2020 and 2.938% by 2025, just hitting 
the pre-set target in the MLNP.    
(insert Figure 1 here)
(insert Figure 2 here)
Other innovation performance indicators as of 2017 display a mixed picture of the 
establishment of the innovation-driven economy. As shown in Table 1, China made 
praiseworthy progress in Science and Technology to economic growth, such as R&D personnel 
in 10,000 working population (Person-year) and an international ranking for citations of 
scientific papers by Chinese scientists. However, China was not able to achieve the target of 
R&D spending as a share of GDP in 2015, which was 2.2, or high-tech value-added as a percent 
of manufacturing as a whole. 
(insert Table 1 here)
To get a fuller picture of China’s innovation performance, we then analyse a few indicators 
by accessing evidence from international studies. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a 
yearly report first developed by WEF in 2004, is used as a standard to measure a country’s 
competitiveness and, therefore, is expected to be related to economic strength and growth. The 
GCI uses a comprehensive dashboard of 100 variables, organised into 12 pillars, with each 
pillar representing an area considered as an essential determinant of competitiveness. In the 
GCI 2018, the innovation ecosystem is an integral part of national competitiveness. As 
mentioned previously, innovation is a complex process, happening within an ecosystem of a 
variety of factors (World Economic Forum, 2018). The WEF designed the innovation capability 
and business dynamism pillars to assess each economy’s innovation ecosystem. Innovation 
capability, comprising indicators on the less tangible aspects of idea generation, is captured in 
interaction and diversity, as well as Research and Development and commercialisation (the 
capacity to successfully bring innovation to the market) sub-pillars. The business dynamism 
pillar captures broader factors summarised in two sub-pillars: Administrative requirements (the 
extent to which the regulatory framework supports creative destruction by making it easy to 
found and close companies) and entrepreneurial culture (a country’s willingness to take risks 
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and embrace disruptive ideas). 
Similar to the WEF, INSEAD first published its Global Innovation Index (GII) in 2007. Since 
then, it has generated a yearly report and index. The aim of the GII is to help create an 
environment wherein innovation factors are continually evaluated. The GII index contains four 
measures: the overall GII (simple average of the input and output sub-index scores); the input 
sub-index, which is based on five pillars (institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, 
market sophistication and business sophistication); the innovation output sub-index, which has 
two pillars (knowledge and technology outputs and creative outputs); and the innovation 
efficiency ratio (ratio of the output sub-index score to input sub-index score). The GII and GCI 
provide different pictures of innovation because of diversified data resources and the analytical 
framework they used. 
China's rapid rise in the GII rankings over the last few years has been spectacular. Since 
2016, China featured in the top 25 and continuously moved forward to 17th in 2018. China’s 
innovation prowess is conspicuous in many aspects. China has made phenomenal progress in 
areas like international R&D companies, high-tech imports, the quality of its publications, and 
tertiary enrolment. Most of all, China is now ranked 1st or 2nd in areas such as R&D expenditures 
and the number of researchers, patents, and publications, which are far ahead of most high-
income economies (INSEAD, 2018). 
Similarly, the European Commission published the ‘Innovation Union Scoreboard 2018’ in 
May 2018 (EU, 2018), which holds the same opinion. Although the primary purpose of this 
report is to assess the innovation performance of 27 member states, China and other non-EU 
countries were included for comparison. The EU report concludes that, while the EU continues 
to improve its position vis-à-vis the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada and is catching 
up to South Korea, China has shown a growth rate three times faster than that of the EU-27. 
The report indicates that China is improving in nine indicators (tertiary education, international 
co-publications, most cited publications, R&D expenditure public sector, R&D expenditure 
business sector, public-private co-publications, PCT patent applications, trademark application, 
design applications) and has strengths in business R&D expenditures and trademark and design. 
Overall, China has achieved outstanding innovation performance with particular regard to 
research and development, knowledge and technology outputs, and business sophistication. As 
seen in Figures 3 and 4, China outscores the high-income group in the GII and innovation-
driven economies in the GCI. Specifically with regard to the innovation input sub-index in the 
GII report, China has moved into the top 30 in human capital & research (23rd), determined as 
education, tertiary education and research & development; infrastructure (29th), identified as 
information & communication technologies (ICTs), general infrastructure and ecological 
sustainability; market sophistication (25th), determined as credit, investment and trade, 
competition and market value; and business sophistication (9th), defined as knowledge workers, 
innovation linkages and knowledge absorption. However, in comparison with the high-income 
group including the United States, and the middle-income group, where China exists, we 
identified the major bottleneck in the innovation system of China. Although China is a leading 
innovation power, its institutional framework, comprising its political environment, regulatory 
environment, and business environment, lags far behind than those economies shown in Figure 
3. 
Weak institutions are quite common in emerging economies, and a series of studies have 
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shown that the innovation effort of companies in any nation can be negatively affected by that 
nation's formal political-economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; North, 1990; 
Walder et al., 2015). In addition, the GCI report shown in Figure 4 indicates that China is 
already more advanced when it comes to investing in the research and development sub-pillar 
than innovation-driven economies, whereas commercialisation, administrative requirements, 
interaction and diversity, and entrepreneurial culture are the weak links in China's innovations 
system when compared to innovation-driven economies. It indicates that Chinese universities 
and research institutions need to be encouraged to bring their best innovative technology to the 
market. Also, developing and enabling a dynamic regulatory framework to encourage start-up 
companies s necessary, as is building an entrepreneurship-friendly environment that enables 
stakeholders to carry out innovative activities.
(insert Figure 3 here)
(insert Figure 4 here)
4.2 The characters of China’s innovation process
China's innovation performance manifested its attempts to transform itself from a low value-
added manufacturing centre to recognised innovation leader, particularly because lower-cost 
economies compete for China's core business (OECD, 2015). Innovation is, indeed, the primary 
force behind China's new round of economic growth, structural adjustment and industrial 
transformation and upgrade. According to the Mckinsey Global Institute (2015), China has 
established strength in efficiency-driven and customer-focused innovation regarding products 
like mobile phones, household appliances, solar panels, and railway equipment, which have 
reached the world’s frontline. Firms innovate by solving engineering issues using accumulated 
know-how, integrating technologies from suppliers and partners, and generating discoveries 
and turning them into products. In this context, central government support and policy continue 
to play a large role in science and engineering-based innovation, such as acquiring critical 
knowledge through purchasing programs that drive local demand and by facilitating knowledge 
and technology transfer with foreign joint-venture partners and expanding expenses on higher 
education and R&D funding (ibid.). 
Given the evolution of China's innovation process, Chung and Tan (2017) identified three 
dominant themes: yin (引), Tiao (调) and Chuang (创). 'Yin' represents the initial innovation 
development stage which is 'duplicative imitation' and has the meaning of introducing and 
adopting others' knowledge or experience. The next stage is 'Tiao', a transition stage between 
imitation and innovation that involves adjusting and improving existing products, services and 
technology. The last is the ‘original innovation' stage defined as 'Chuang', which means creating 
new items and developing indigenous innovation. Most importantly, this evolving process is 
heavily influenced by Chinese characteristics: size effect, knowledge-absorptive capacities, and 
extensive manufacturing ecosystems. 
First, China is a massive nation, both in terms of geographical size and population. Both 
provide a positive effect such as cost reduction by the migration of hundreds of millions of 
peasants from the countryside and a skilled workforce that involves numerous scientists 
graduating from universities. Fishman (2012) explained the meaning behind this fact as the 
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productive might of China's vast low-cost manufacturing machine, along with the swelling 
appetites of its billion-plus consumers, having turned China's people into what is arguably the 
greatest natural resource on the planet. It also means that China has accumulated vast resources 
to pursue innovation. In addition, China's huge market can become a platform for accelerated 
innovation (Fu and Xiong, 2011). 
Second, a knowledge-absorptive capacity refers to a firm's ability to create and arrange the 
knowledge for developing operational capabilities and achieve a competitive advantage (Zahra 
and George, 2002; Sun and Anderson, 2010). Since China's ‘open door' policy was 
implemented in 1978, it has always been a technological follower, taking advantage of the 
accumulated knowledge and technology from advanced economies. Being a 'technological 
follower' can reduce the risk stemming from pioneering costs (Mohan et al., 2015). This can 
explain why many Chinese firms adopted an imitation approach, which is an affordable and 
profitable approach and can help the firms build up their innovation capacities. 
Third, as the world's largest manufacturing economy, China has built an unmatched 
manufacturing ecosystem that enables continuous process innovation, with the world's largest 
supplier base, a massive manufacturing workforce, and a modern supply-chain infrastructure 
(Mckinsey Global Institute, 2015). Despite all these advantages, China is now in a hurry to step 
up its effort in original innovation. From the other perspective, China's economic prowess, to a 
large extent, is dependent on its achievements in manufacturing goods, not on the design and 
marketing of these goods (Hulten and Hao, 2012), implying that China's technological strength 
is currently built on perfecting innovation invented by novel-product master nations, not on 
novel-product innovation itself. However, Breznitz and Murphree (2011) have argued that, for 
China to gain sustained economic growth, ther  is no urgency for it to become a master at novel-
product-innovation. A recent example was in early 2018 where Zhongxing 
Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE), one of China's leading technology 
exporters, was banned from the U.S. market, nearly bringing it close to bankruptcy. The block 
on ZTE was a wake-up call as it exposed the Achilles' heel of China's hi-tech industry—its 
lingering reliance on key foreign technologies, and the issue of a lack of control over core 
technology. Therefore, there is no denying that China should revive its emphasis on indigenous 
innovation. Furthermore, according to an analysis of China's innovation performance, China is 
currently on the point of transforming itself from a technological follower to innovation leader 
with high expectations. However, considering the current political environment, this will not 
be an easy process. 
5. Chinese Experiences in Developing an Innovation-driven Economy
Many researchers have characterised the Chinese innovation development phases as imitation 
to innovation (Zhou, 2006; Dobson and Safaian, 2008; Yip and Mckern, 2016) or imilar to the 
early Japanese and South Korean development stages (Liu and White, 2001; Xia, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the Chinese government established many policies to boost innovation capacities 
to transform itself from 'Made in China' to 'Designed in China' (China State Council, 2015; 
Fuller, 2009). Many of those policies are China's emulation of successful international 
experiences, and some others are novel and experimental. So far, there is not enough empirical 
data to evaluate whether these policies have met the objectives and brought in inspiring 
outcomes. Nevertheless, it has become apparent that a consensus has emerged concerning the 
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quantitative improvements in China's science, technology and innovation outcomes after the 
government implemented these policies. However, some China researchers have argued that 
the qualitative change in China's indigenous innovation has remained, albeit blurred, pointing 
to the fact that China has few world-beating innovations and game-changing products and 
services, whereas Orr and Roth (2012) asserted that China is innovating, evident in both 
business-to-consumer and business-to-business sectors. China is now trying to push itself 
towards an innovation-driven economy within its social context, which seems to be a great 
experiment in front of the world. China's experiences with innovation are important for 
policymakers in other rapidly emerging economies. The question about what has been China's 
experiences so far has received a great deal of attention, but there is little consensus as to the 
answer. Although we draw several conclusions about China's experiences instead of complete 
responses, we hope to encourage different thought patterns when reviewing China’s innovation 
trajectory. 
5.1 Formulating successive policies to encourage innovation and planning strategically
Since the 1970s, the modernisation of science and technology has been positioned as one of the 
'four modernisations', along with those of industry, agriculture and national defence, underlying 
reform and opening up, and the government has been actively and consistently supporting 
innovation to accomplish it. In particular, the announcement of the MLNP in 2006 has shown 
the determination of the central government to transform China into an innovation-driven 
nation. In the plan, the State Council committed to supporting eight areas in advanced 
technologies to cultivate and improve China's core competence in technology (State Council, 
2006). Additionally, at the 18th Communist Party Congress in November 2012, scientific and 
technological innovation was instituted as 'strategic support for raising the productive forces 
and boosting the overall national strength'. The strategy of innovation has been inherited by the 
government of Xi Jinping that took office following the 18th Party Congress. 
In 2015, the 'Made in China 2025' initiative was developed jointly by China's National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), with additional contributions from the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) and other constituencies, to enhance China's innovation power (State 
Council, 2017). This plan sets up strategy goals for innovation-driven development for the next 
10 years from 2016 to 2025 and signals China's determination to transform its industry from 
labour-intensive production to knowledge-intensive manufacturing. The primary focus of this 
plan is to improve the quality of Chinese products, strengthen China's brands and develop 
cutting-edge advanced technologies. Specifically, this plan identifies 10 industries as a priority: 
information technology, high-end numerical control machinery and automation, aerospace, and 
aviation equipment, maritime engineering equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing, rail 
equipment, energy-saving vehicles, electrical equipment, new material, biomedicine and high-
performance medical apparatus and agricultural equipment (ibid.). 
In the same year, the 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP) was announced with a set of new 
development principles to pursue innovation-based, balanced, green, and open economics 
growth. The 12th FYP shows the realisation of the old growth model as a road leading to 
nowhere and needing to embark on transitional measures by the Chinese central government, 
while the 13th FYP indicates that they have already drafted a future blueprint (Kennedy and 
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Johnson, 2016). Undoubtedly, the FYP is a kind of strategic plan for aligning the objectives of 
the national innovation system with long-term national economic goals. As for the advantages 
of this planning system, Heilmann and Melton (2013) explained that the development plan in 
China is a valuable management tool for strategic policy coordination, resource mobilisation, 
and macroeconomic control. Additionally, strategic plans such as the MLNP and FYP build 
consensus across parties from top to bottom, serving as a guideline for ministry-specific and 
lower-level implementation (Ahrens, 2013). It is also worth stressing that this long-term 
planning is beneficial to innovation policy design and implementation through signal delivering 
and building consensus.  
5.2 Giving space to the spontaneity of creativity and encouraging 'grassroots innovation'
If China’s innovation route only followed national strategic planning as led by the government, 
it would not have accomplished such achievements in the past years (Ding and Li, 2015). Many 
success stories of innovation have come from outside of strategic planning. For example, 
considerable technological breakthroughs in the industry fields largely come from non-
government planning. The most likely reason is that government-led national S&T programmes 
are incapable of addressing non-consensual research projects and provide them with sufficient 
financial support (ibid.). Therefore, some remarkable technological breakthroughs are made by 
individuals, non-government research institutions and private enterprises, which could be 
referred as 'grassroots' (caogen). Grassroots innovation (GI) refers to 'networks of activities and 
organizations generating novel bottom-up solutions for sustainable development, solutions that 
respond to the local situation and interests and values of communities involved' (Seyfang and 
Smith, 2007, p.585). Also, GI stands for innovation generated by civil society rather than 
government or business (Tang, 2011). In the Chinese context, GI is the bottom-up innovation 
starting from grassroots, including blue-collar workers, unemployed workers, farmers, non-
governmental scientific research institutions and private enterprises, and their innovation 
inherits China's traditional culture and wisdom. For example, Chinese Internet giant Alibaba’s 
greatest innovation stems from unleashing the forces of grassroots entrepreneurship. In order 
to facilitate China's move towards becoming a fertile ground for innovation, GI has been 
encouraged by policies aimed at supporting Science and Technology (S&T) education in rural 
areas through programs like S&T for Rural Areas and Farmers, STI laboratory for Country 
Teenagers, Poverty Alleviation by Education, and others. Furthermore, the government 
promotes GI by providing S&T services such as innovation incubation, financing loans and 
technical consultations (CAST, 2016).  
More generally, the locus of the GI movement in China is the Pearl River Delta, and the most 
successful story is that of Shenzhen, China's Special Economic Zone. As a 'city of the maker', 
Shenzhen witnessed an explosion of maker-spaces, incubators and Fablabs. Also, the city leads 
the world in such sectors as supercomputing, gene sequencing, metamaterial, and 4G 
technology. It is home to over a thousand labs, including key labs, engineering labs, engineering 
centres, and corporate technology centres. The Pearl River Delta region was designated as an 
experimental zone by the Chinese government because of its distance from Beijing and 
remoteness. Being the site of reform, local cadres developed a desire for more autonomy from 
Beijing's official culture and, at the same time, allied with business and investors from Hong 
Kong to develop export-oriented industries using local land and labour. The reform encouraged 
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Hong Kong to finance and locally initiate Town Village Enterprises (TVEs) to grow. The 
grassroots development contributed to the rise of Shenzhen, and Pearl River Delta region more 
generally rather than planned actions by the central state (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011).
On the other hand, the government provides scientific and technological services to support 
grassroots innovation. These services' platforms and networks allow entities to find suitable 
partners for grassroots innovators and projects, help incubate projects and provide start-up 
funding. Such services include the provision of technical advice and guidance for grassroots 
innovators and projects, as well as intellectual property rights protections and assistance in 
product development, such as 'Garage Café', where entrepreneurs can, for the price of a cup of 
coffee, enjoy a free open office environment and share ideas. Other examples include plentiful 
incubation bases co-established by universities for students and recent graduates to realise their 
business ideas and start-ups. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the youth entrepreneurship 
service associations and 'innovation workshops' that help young people set up their own 
business by releasing the latest information about policies and the markets and providing 
information from internal resources. 
More importantly, the central and local government carried out various science 
popularisation projects to promote scientific knowledge among the grassroots class. For 
example, in 2006, the central government launched the 'science popularisation benefitting 
villages and agriculture project' through 'model demonstrations' seeking to reward leading, 
demonstrative, and far-reaching professional agricultural associations, science demonstration 
bases, pioneers in rural science popularisation and science popularisation teams for ethnic 
minorities. The China Association for Science and Technology, Ministry of Education and 
MOST have also organised an annual event, the National Youth Science and Technology 
Innovation Contest. Moreover, MOST, with five other departments, including the CPC 
Department of Organisation and the China Association for Science and Technology, launched 
the Rural Youth Science and Technology Innovation Laboratory project (CAST, 2016).
5.3 The ‘invisible hand’ shaking the ‘visible hand’
Before China began economic reform, the economy was planned by the government, which 
acted as the ‘visible hand' involved in all spectrums of economic life. The overall objective of 
economic reform was to move from a system under which all parties obeyed specific centralised 
commands to a decentralised system to improve the system of managerial resource allocation 
that is responsive to market forces, referred as the ‘invisible hand' (Groves et al., 1995). Since 
1992, China, having established the so-called socialist market system with Chinese 
characteristics, achieved formidable economic development, emerging as the second-largest 
economy in the world. Hu (2013) explained the hybrid mechanisms underpinning this socialist 
market system as the cooperation of ‘visible hands' and ‘invisible hands.' The invisible hand 
(or market economy) aims to promote economic prosperity and provides private goods while 
the visible hand (planned economy) is engaged in developing a harmonious society and 
providing public goods. This cooperation enables the government to serve as a market guide 
and provide necessary supplements to the market as well as facilitate a market-friendly 
environment.   
This hybrid mechanism has performed well for facilities innovation. Plenty of evidence has 
testified to this. For instance, central and local governments significantly developed venture 
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capital markets to finance innovation. Specifically, the venture capital markets has facilitated 
many indigenous firms in recent years in exploiting financing channels, absorbing social capital, 
and establishing and strengthening the social-industrial investment fund to reform traditional 
high-tech industries. China's central government laid down a set of policy goals to build a 
venture capital mechanism and develop public venture capital institutions (Fu, 2015). Moreover, 
the government also played a facilitating role in supporting technology firms by developing 
various S&T-oriented financial products. In transition economies such as China's, the 
government plays a vital role in the developing innovation capabilities through direct 
intervention and its industrial and S&T policies (Choi et al., 2011). Policymaking with respect 
to incentives for innovation over the past few years has emphasised the function of the market 
for stimulating innovation, pushing the government from the front stage (Ding and Li, 2015). 
In this connection, balancing the ‘visible hand' and the ‘invisible hand' is not an easy task. 
Armannios et al. (2017) suggested that local governments in emerging economies such as 
China's act as an institutional entrepreneur, controlling the allocation and utilisation of critical 
public resources and exerting considerable influence on regional development and 
entrepreneurship (Smallbone and Welter, 2012). With such resource under their control, some 
Chinese local governments have not yet clarified its relations with the market, interfering too 
much in some microeconomic activities, thus invalidating the market mechanism (Xiao, 2017). 
Accordingly, government-market problems remain unsolved, especially at the local level. Fu 
(2015) pointed that local government often provide subsidies to promote certain industries thus 
create market dispute. In fact, from the past until now, the process of China's economic reform 
has been the process of making the ‘visible hand’ shake the ‘invisible hand' and letting them 
play their proper roles to ensure sustainable development. With deepening reform in years to 
come, these puzzles will be answered.   
5.4 Engaging state-owned and privately-owned firms in collaborative innovation
During China's economic reform, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have played or are playing 
an essential role in the market. Most SOEs are the leading providers of public services such as 
energy, infrastructure and transport, indicating that they have a crucial influence on the 
everyday life of citizens and the economy. Since late 1978, China began to reform the SOEs 
that had been a critical component of China's transformation into a socialist market economy 
(Fischer and Gelb, 1991). First, Chinas restructured the SOEs in the 1990s by following the 
adoption of the new Company Law in 1994, which provides a uniform legal framework for 
ownership reform. Second, it allowed SOEs to go bankrupt or be sold to private buyers and 
companies if they had lost their competitiveness in the mid-1990s. Third, the government set 
up the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 to 
take over the control of large SOEs. Up to today, SOEs reform has already achieved some 
outstanding accomplishments regarding firm performance, but it still faces an enormous 
challenge in China's transition process.
Nevertheless, most academic literature suggests that SOEs operate less innovatively than 
private firms (Jefferson et al., 2006; Zhang et al. 2003). Most such arguments build on evidence 
that SOEs are governed by administrative rather than economic imperatives, government 
intervention is inescapable, and numerous political tasks impede firm development. Moreover, 
managers in SOEs often lack incentives to pursue market-driven, efficiency-based innovative 
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activities and just routinely fulfil administrative tasks (Freund, 2001; Ramamurti, 2000). That 
notwithstanding, evidence suggests that some SOEs have achieved great success in applied 
research and innovation in such areas as nuclear energy, the defence sector, and electricity 
networks, as well as less apparent areas like telecommunications (Kou and Henning, 2017). 
Further, while SOEs play an important role in the transition period, private-owned enterprises 
(POEs) have overgrown. Tan (2006a, b) revealed that decision makers in POEs are more likely 
to make innovative and risk-taking decisions when faced with market uncertainty and 
technology turbulences than SOEs. Fu (2014) echoed the viewpoint, pointing out that POEs 
appear to choose to open up their innovation process to overcome the constraints and risks they 
face in innovation. Although SOEs have been a major force in the Chinese economy in the early 
stage of reform, POEs are currently more efficient in innovation and are producing more 
innovative outcomes. However, both SOEs and POEs have their comparative advantages in 
different areas. Also, SOEs have taken a leading role in pushing forward the technology frontier 
among Chinese firms, while POEs offer the most contributions to technology upgrading and 
innovation. Therefore, instead of a pure market-driven model or a state-led model of innovation, 
China's path to innovation follows a multi-driver model led by a mix of players. It appears that 
SOEs and POEs are encouraged by the central government to carry on win-win cooperation 
and pursue inclusive development. That said, engaging SOEs and POEs in 'collaborative 
innovation' helps firms acquire missing knowledge and complements resources of finance to 
reduce the risk and cost as well as to enlarge their social networks (Hoffman and Schlosser, 
2001).  
5.5 Combining the principles of 'going out' and 'bringing in'
Recently, a report delivered by Xi Jinping at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) stated that: 
We should pursue the Belt and Road Initiative as a priority, give equal emphasis to 'bring in' 
and 'going global', follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and 
collaboration, and increase openness and cooperation in building innovation capacity. With 
these efforts, we hope to make new ground in opening China further through links running 
eastward and westward, across the land and over the sea.
Xi's report calls for building up China's strength for international economic cooperation and 
competition, which testifies to the country's will to open up on all fronts. Also, it shows that, 
regarding global governance, China is transforming from a bystander and follower to a 
practitioner and forerunner. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, 
was a declaration of China's vision for international and regional cooperation and shared 
benefits and sustainable development. Under the BRI, China has strengthened cooperation with 
participating countries in many aspects, such as infrastructure connectivity, production capacity, 
trade, investment and finance. Up though 2017, Chinese firms have established 56 economic 
and trade cooperation zones in more than 20 countries, with a total investment exceeding USD 
18.5 billion, generating USD 1.1 billion in tax revenue and 180,000 jobs for these countries 
(MOST, 2017). Cai (2017) emphasised that the BRI offers an opportunity for China to build its 
regional leadership through many programs of economic integration. The major purpose of the 
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BRI is for China to become a centre of advanced manufacturing and innovation and even a 
standard setter by creating a regional production chain. Not only is China trying to export 
higher-end goods through the BRI, it is also expecting participating countries to accept Chinese 
standards. The Chinese government has a broader ambition to become an innovation-based 
economy and a leader of R&D with its focus on exporting technological measures. 
On the other hand, China has also introduced new policies to ease market access for foreign 
investment and encourage foreign firms to enter into the Chinese market, while, at the same 
time, creating a fairer business environment for foreign and domestic enterprises (Xinhua, 
2017). For example, on January 17, 2017, the central government issued a 'Circular Concerning 
Measures on the Further Opening up and Actively Utilizing Foreign Investment', which listed 
20 specific measures to further open up its economy, improve the business environment, and 
bring more foreign investment into China. Particularly, the Catalogue for the Guidance of 
Industries for Foreign Investment has been revised to further open the service, manufacturing, 
and mining sectors to foreign investment. These foreign investments are willing to take part in 
the implementation of China's innovation-driven development plans, such as 'Made in China 
2025', are strongly encouraged by the Chinese government (State Council, 2017). 
Apart from continuously bringing in qualified foreign investment, China has also promoted 
people-to-people exchanges under the BRI with the aim of promoting innovation alliance. In 
recent years, the cooperation on scientific and technological innovation has been fruitful in 
enhancing Chinese firms' capabilities in the creation of innovation outcomes that are ground-
breaking to the world. Since 2011, MOST has organised more than 200 training workshops, 
attracting 5,000 trainees for other developing countries. In 2013, MOST launched the Talented 
Young Scientist Program for scholars below the age of 45 from other developing countries to 
pay short-term working visits of 6 to 12 months at research institutions, universities or 
companies in China. In 2016, MOST, the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce jointly released the Plan on 
Cooperation in STI under the BRI. It involves a series of 'bring in' activities, such as inviting 
2,500 young foreign scientists for short-term research in China, training 5,000 foreign R&D 
and administrative staff and building 50 joint labs in the next five years (MOST, 2017).
5.6 Chinese people and embracing culture
The terms ‘common destiny' or ‘shared future' have become a recurrent feature in many of Xi's 
speeches, which shows his vision of space as referring to a ‘common' or ‘shared' ‘future of 
mankind. This version has expanded from a narrow perspective of commonality among 
peripheral countries with the same destiny to the wider dream of new world order. Xi's concept 
of ‘a community with a shared future for mankind’ (renlei mingyun gongtongti) identifies the 
overarching goals of China’s foreign policy in the years ahead, and, after the 19th Party 
Congress, it was incorporated into the Party Constitution as an essential part of Xi Jinping’s 
thought. This concept has been inspired by 5,000 years of Chinese civilization. The nation has 
always pursued and inherited a firm idea of peace, harmony and tolerance (Wang, 2018). The 
‘embracing culture' which advocates ‘harmony' rooted in Chinese culture for thousands of years 
has been brought into China's global outlook, a new win-win model in international relations 
and future innovation-driven development. Following this, Li-Hua (2014) proposed a strategic 
model called ‘China's embracing innovation' to refer to the strategic model of the wise who are 
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seeking common development, sharing resources and a win-win solution. Embracing 
innovation is a novel and innovative solution to a complicated social problem, which defines 
the concept of embracing innovation as a social innovation with Chinese characteristics. It 
demonstrates that there is no future for narrow-minded and short-sighted anti-globalisation 
movements. Also, it is helpful to embrace contradiction and seek common ground while 
maintaining differences, so that the completeness of Chinese firms could be maintained (Li-
Hua, 2017). An example from many successful stories of Chinese firms is in 2010, the Chinese 
Car manufacturer Geely acquired the luxury car brand Volvo and proactively helped Volvo 
build a plant in China. Following a refocus of Volvo’s product line under Geely, the brand has 
since moved upmarket to compete against other luxury brands, such as BMW. Also, Geely and 
Volvo have built several R&D centres with the aim of becoming a major player in the global 
auto industry. 
Along with the ‘embracing culture' that has profoundly influenced the Chinese innovation 
model, human resources has also become the key source to gain and sustain a competitive 
advantage in the internal building of capability for innovation. Based on the vast Chinese labour 
market, the accumulation of high technology and talented technicians are of great importance 
to the government and Chinese enterprises. Lee and Peterson (2000) pointed out that the 
Chinese have been entrepreneurial throughout their history and are incredibly hardworking. 
The younger generation especially is developing an entrepreneurial spirit characterised by 
innovative thinking, modernisation and individualism. The latest OECD statistics (2017) 
confirmed this viewpoint that Chinese workers log an average of 2,000 to 2,200 working hours 
each year, which is far higher than their counterparts in the United States (1,790 hours per year), 
the Netherlands (1,419), Germany (1,371), and even Japan (1,719). Hence, without question, 
the intelligent, entrepreneurial, and hard-working Chinese are the principal source of the 
indigenous innovation of Chinese enterprises to face global challenges.
6. Discussion 
6.1 Trends of innovation in China
China has achieved remarkable transformation over the past 40 years, with an excellent speed 
of growth driven mostly by a high level of investment, both domestic and foreign. Its openness 
to investment and trade, combined with its particular advantages in the labour market and 
market scale, has made it the world's manufacturing superpower. However, the real question 
for China's future concerns is becoming an innovative country and eventually moving towards 
becoming an innovation powerhouse. In China's 40 years development, our study demonstrates 
that the institutional foundations of national innovation system are already being laid, and, so 
far, China has made extraordinary progress regarding innovation performance from country to 
region and from business to individual. 
Given the 13th FYP, China is set to take innovation as the driving force for development. It 
contemplates finding new drivers by making use of scientific innovations and encouraging mass 
innovation and entrepreneurship. It also announced the launch of six key scientific and 
technological (S&T) projects as well as nine other major projects under the 'Scientific 
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Innovation 2030' initiative3, as well as the implementation of the 'Made in China 2025' strategy 
for building a strong manufacturing country to improve the manufacturing sector’s innovation 
capacity and competitive edge, while promoting the development of strategic emerging 
industries. Additionally, this strategy will promote the application of information technology 
and seek to expand the scope of the online economy. Based on these development directions, it 
can be expected that, under China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, efforts will be made to implement the 
Made in China 2025 initiative in greater depth, thus achieving China’s objectives of becoming 
a manufacturing powerhouse, creating a favourable environment for the growth of new strategic 
industries and optimising modern industrial systems. 
6.2 Challenges of innovation in China
Admittedly, China still faces extraordinary challenges in its innovation-driven development. 
First, the quality and practice of Chinese innovation still lag behind the world's top innovators. 
Instead of being an 'innovation sponge', China should push itself to be a leader by innovating 
independently. Although being an 'innovative sponge' benefits Chinese firms to grasp advanced 
knowledge and technology quickly by shortening R&D time and resources, in the long run, this 
approach will not help them develop much-needed core technologies (World Economic Forum, 
2016). Second, although China has surged to become the world's largest producer of scientific 
papers, when, it comes to high-profile research, China is still a long way behind countries like 
the United States. Third, the quality and quantity of self-relied intellectual property still needs 
to be improved to make China an innovative country. Public awareness of the importance of 
intellectual property is comparatively weak. Thus, there remains a relatively serious problem 
of infringement of intellectual property (Devonshire-Ellis et al., 2011). Fourth, some SOEs face 
challenges in their management system and R&D infrastructure. For other large SOEs, as 
industry leaders and national innovators, it is urgent to improve their efficiency of resource 
allocation and enhance their capabilities. Fifth, the outputs of original S&T are inadequate, and 
core technologies are limited. According to the World Economic Forum (2016), despite China 
becoming the world's largest manufacturer of smartphones and personal computers, the 
industry still depends on other countries for high-performance circuits and infrastructure 
software. In 2015, China’s imports of integrated circuits amounted to $230 billion, representing 
13.7% of the total imported goods and the single largest item. Over 90% of China’s computer 
central processing units (CPU) and advanced 4G smartphone chip markets are controlled by 
foreign companies. Last and more fundamental challenge is above mentioned the balancing of 
government-market relationship. For example, market trade dispute could be caused by 
selective policies, especially those subsidies and preferential policies to promote the growth of 
certain industries. To reduce this problem, the Government should allocate more resources and 
3 For more long-term development by 2030, the 13th FYP makes it clear that China will launch a number of key 
S&T projects and major development projects of national strategic significance. The six key S&T projects cover the 
fields of aviation engine and gas turbines; deep underwater stations; quantum teleportation and quantum computers; 
neuroscience and brain-like intelligence studies; national cyberspace security; and deep space exploration and on-
orbit service and maintenance systems for spacecraft. The nine major development projects include independent 
innovation in the farming industry; efficient and clean use of coal; smart grid; integrated space-terrestrial information 
networks; big data analytics; smart manufacturing and robotics; research and application of major new materials; 
comprehensive environmental improvement of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region; and healthcare.
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use more horizontal policies to support education, R&D, and improve the institutional 
environment. Additionally, instead of intervening in market-led activities such as most of 
commercialisation process, the government must focus on those activities which easy to suffer 
from market failure, such as basic research that involves high risk and uncertainties and provide 
them long-term investment and necessary preferential policies. Overall, those challenges need 
to be overcome by deeper reform, national innovation system improvements, and policy 
refinement. 
7.  Conclusions
This paper offers the following main contribution. First, given the historic review of China’s 
innovation development, we highlight three watershed years since the 1978 reforms to explain 
China’s aspiration for innovation. We proved that this aspiration is rooted in the national 
situation of China’s growth model, and, to pursue sustainable growth, China seeking a more 
skill-intensive and technology-intensive growth path. Second, we reviewed the evolution of 
China’s strategic development plans and used different data to analyse the performance of 
China’s innovation development and its position compared to other innovation-driven 
economies, revealing that China has achieved outstanding innovation performance with 
particular regard to research and development, knowledge and technology outputs, and business 
sophistication. Consequently, China is currently on the point of transforming itself from a 
technological follower to innovation leader with high expectations. Third, and most important, 
we identified six interesting and unique Chinese experiences in innovation-driven development. 
As this research focused on China’s innovation-driven development, the findings may not be 
generalisable to other countries. However, the Chinese experiences could be applicable to some 
emerging economies such as India and other south Asian countries. More broadly, both 
developed and developing countries could benefit from the Chinese model of innovation in the 
long run (Mckinsey Global Institute, 2015).    
Although this paper has conducted a comprehensive analysis of China’s 40-year road to 
innovation, there needs to be in-depth discussions on several important issues considering that 
innovation is a complicated system. These issues include but are not limited to the impact 
factors on the propensity, intensity and quality of innovation at the macro, meso and micro 
levels. For instance, at the macro level, questions emerge, such as what is the role of the 
government in China’s innovation system and in which industries, using what tools, to what 
extent and in what order should policies be implemented to regulate the market? At the meso 
level, what are the factors that affect the efficiency of innovation at the project and industry 
levels? What is the role of the public sector in a national innovation system? At the micro level, 
what could be used to promote the propensity and intensity of innovation in Chinese firms?
As a national strategy, innovation can be viewed as a marathon run between countries and 
economies. In China's case, future research should focus on (a) the different means of creating 
an institutional and policy environment which is more conducive to innovation and the 
mechanism of inspiring and protecting entrepreneurship; (b) policies/institutional mechanisms 
that strictly protect all kinds of property rights so that innovative entrepreneurs have stable 
expectations and enjoy innovation and entrepreneurial achievements; and (c) as innovation is 
driven by people, how is it relayed from generation to generation? Other questions include 
where do these tough and innovative entrepreneurs come from? How do we make the new 
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generation more creative with a global vision and let them have the courage to challenge 
authority and dare to break through the cage of old thinking?
One powerful solution is to reform the current Chinese education system that emphasises 
respect for and attention to existing knowledge and doctrine, rather than fostering critical 
thinking and challenging existing limits. Studies on innovation and entrepreneurship education 
in China are necessary for the development of national innovation capacities over the long run. 
For hina to tackle all the challenges, avoid the middle-income trap and achieve the goals laid 
out by Xi Jinping to become 'a moderately prosperous society' by 2020 and 'a great modern 
socialist country' by 2050, it must transform itself into an innovation-driven and high-value-
added market. Such a movement is no longer an option, but a necessity.
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Figure 1. International Comparison of R&D expenditure as share of GDP, 2015 (source: 
calculation based on the World Bank data)
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Table 1 Medium and Long-term National Plan targets and Progress
12th Five-Year Plan 13th Five-Year Plan MLNPAchievement 
as of 2010 Target 
for 2015
Achievement 
as of 2015
Target for 2020
R&D expenditures as % of GDP 1.75 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5
Contribution of progress in S&T to economic growth (%) 50.9 >55 55.3 >60 >60
Dependence of foreign technology (%) 50 <30
International ranking for patents granted to Chinese nations 5th 4th 5th
International ranking for number of citations of scientific papers by Chinese scientists 8th 5th 4th 2th 5th
R&D Personnel in 10,000 working populations (person-year) 34 43 48.5 60
Number of patents granted in 10,000 residents 1.7 3.3 6.3 12
PCT applications (10,000) 1.29 3.05 6.10
Technology market transaction nationwide (RMB billion) 390 800 983.5 2000
High-tech value-added as % of manufacturing as a whole 13 18 13
Citizens with basic science qualification (%) 3.27 5 6.2 10
High-tech enterprises’ sales revenue（RMB trillion） 22.2 34
Knowledge-intensive service industry value-added as % of GDP 11.26 15.6 20
Percentage of Expenditure on R&D to Sales Revenue of Industrial Enterprises above 
Designated Size (%)
0.7 0.9 1.1
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